Investigating the Python bound method

You work with Python for a while and you'll become familiar with printing a method and getting

<bound method Foo.function of <__main__.Foo instance at 0xb736960c>>

I think there is room for one more explanation on the internet, since I've never seen it diagrammed out (maybe for good reason!).

An illustration of Python bound methods

In the above diagram on the left, we have the fairly simple conceptual model of a class with a function. One naturally tends to think of the function as a part of the class and your instance calls into that function. This is conceptually correct, but a little abstracted from what's actually happening.

The right attempts to illustrate the underlying process in some more depth. The first step, on the top right, is building something like the following:

class Foo():
   def function(self):
       print "hi!"

As this illustrates, the above code results in two things happening; firstly a function object for function is created and secondly the __dict__ attribute of the class is given a key function that points to this function object.

Now the thing about this function object is that it implements the descriptor protocol. In short, if an object implements a __get__ function; then when that object is accessed as an attribute of an object the __get__ function is called. You can read up on the descriptor protocol, but the important part to remember is that it passes in the context from which it is called; that is the object that is calling the function.

So, for example, when we then do the following:

f = Foo()
f.function()

what happens is that we get the attribute function of f and then call it. f above doesn't actually know anything about function as such — what it does know is its class inheritance and so Python goes searching the parent's class __dict__ to try and find the function attribute. It finds this, and as per the descriptor protocol when the attribute is accessed it calls the __get__ function of the underlying function object.

What happens now is that the function's __get__ method returns essentially a wrapper object that stores the information to bind the function to the object. This wrapper object is of type types.MethodType and you can see it stores some important attributes in the object — im_func which is the function to call, and im_self which is the object who called it. Passing the object through to im_self is how function gets it's first self argument (the calling object).

So when you print the value of f.function() you see it report itself as a bound method. So hopefully this illustrates that a bound method is a just a special object that knows how to call an underlying function with context about the object that's calling it.

To try and make this a little more concrete, consider the following program:

import types

class Foo():

    def function(self):
        print "hi!"

f = Foo()

# this is a function object
print Foo.__dict__['function']

# this is a method as returned by
#   Foo.__dict__['function'].__get__()
print f.function

# we can check that this is an instance of MethodType
print type(f.function) == types.MethodType

# the im_func field of the MethodType is the underlying function
print f.function.im_func
print Foo.__dict__['function']

# these are the same object
print f.function.im_self
print f

Running this gives output something like

$ python ./foo.py
<function function at 0xb73540d4>
<bound method Foo.function of <__main__.Foo instance at 0xb736960c>>
True
<function function at 0xb73540d4>
<function function at 0xb73540d4>
<__main__.Foo instance at 0xb72c060c>
<__main__.Foo instance at 0xb72c060c>

To pull it apart; we can see that Foo.__dict__['function'] is a function object, but then f.function is a bound method. The bound method's im_func is the underlying function object, and the im_self is the object f: thus im_func(im_self) is calling function with the correct object as the first argument self.

So the main point is to kind of shift thinking about a function as some particular intrinsic part of a class, but rather as a separate object abstracted from the class that gets bound into an instance as required. The class is in some ways a template and namespacing tool to allow you to find the right function objects; it doesn't actually implement the functions as such.

There is plenty more information if you search for "descriptor protocol" and Python binding rules and lots of advanced tricks you can play. But hopefully this is a useful introduction to get an initial handle on what's going on!

Python and --prefix

Something interesting I discovered about Python and --prefix that I can't see a lot of documentation on...

When you build Python you can use the standard --prefix flag to configure to home the installation as you require. You might expect that this would hard-code the location to look for the support libraries to the value you gave; however in reality it doesn't quite work like that.

Python will only look in the directory specified by prefix after it first searches relative to the path of the executing binary. Specifically, it looks at argv[0] and works through a few steps — is argv[0] a symlink? then dereference it. Does argv[0] have any slashes in it? if not, then search the $PATH for the binary. After this, it starts searching for dirname(argv[0])/lib/pythonX.Y/os.py, then dirname(argv[0])/../lib and so on, until it reaches the root. Only after these searches fail does the interpreter then fall back to the hard-coded path specified in the --prefix when configured.

What is the practical implications? It means you can move around a python installation tree and have it all "just work", which is nice. In my situation, I noticed this because we have a completely self-encapsulated build toolchain, but we wish to ship the same interpreter on the thing that we're building (during the build, we run the interpreter to create .pyc files for distribution, and we need to be sure that when we did this we didn't accidentally pick up any of the build hosts python; only the toolchain python).

The PYTHONHOME environment variable does override this behaviour; if it is set then the search stops there. Another interesting thing is that sys.prefix is therefore not the value passed in by --prefix during configure, but the value of the current dynamically determined prefix value.

If you run an strace, you can see this in operation.

readlink("/usr/bin/python", "python2.7", 4096) = 9
readlink("/usr/bin/python2.7", 0xbf8b014c, 4096) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)
stat64("/usr/bin/Modules/Setup", 0xbf8af0a0) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
stat64("/usr/bin/lib/python2.7/os.py", 0xbf8af090) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
stat64("/usr/bin/lib/python2.7/os.pyc", 0xbf8af090) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
stat64("/usr/lib/python2.7/os.py", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=26300, ...}) = 0
stat64("/usr/bin/Modules/Setup", 0xbf8af0a0) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
stat64("/usr/bin/lib/python2.7/lib-dynload", 0xbf8af0a0) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
stat64("/usr/lib/python2.7/lib-dynload", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0

Firstly it dereferences symlinks. Then it looks for Modules/Setup to see if it is running out of the build tree. Then it starts looking for os.py, walking its way upwards. One interesting thing that may either be a bug or a feature, I haven't decided, is that if you set the prefix to / then the interpreter will not go back to the root and then look in /lib. This is probably pretty obscure usage though!

All this is implemented in Modules/getpath.c which has a nice big comment at the top explaining the rules in detail.

pylint and hiding of attributes

I recently came across the pylint error:

E:  3,4:Foo.foo: An attribute affected in foo line 12 hide this method

in code that boiled down to essentially:

class Foo:

    def foo(self):
        return True

    def foo_override(self):
        return False

    def __init__(self, override=False):
        if override:
            self.foo = self.foo_override

Unfortunately that message isn't particularly helpful in figuring out what's going on. I still can't claim to be 100% sure what the message is intended to convey, but I can construct something that maybe it's talking about.

Consider the following using the above class

foo = Foo()
moo = Foo(override=True)

print "expect True  : %s" % foo.foo()
print "expect False : %s" % moo.foo()
print "expect True  : %s" % Foo.foo(foo)
print "expect False : %s" % Foo.foo(moo)

which gives output of:

$ python ./foo.py
expect True  : True
expect False : False
expect True  : True
expect False : True

Now, if you read just about any Python tutorial, it will say something along the lines of:

... the special thing about methods is that the object is passed as the first argument of the function. In our example, the call x.f() is exactly equivalent to MyClass.f(x). In general, calling a method with a list of n arguments is equivalent to calling the corresponding function with an argument list that is created by inserting the method’s object before the first argument. [Official Python Tutorial]

The official tutorial above is careful to say in general; others often don't.

The important point to remember is how python internally resolves attribute references as described by the data model. The moo.foo() call is really moo.__dict__["foo"](moo); examining the __dict__ for the moo object we can see that foo has been re-assigned:

>>> print moo.__dict__
{'foo': <bound method Foo.foo_override of <__main__.Foo instance at 0xb72838ac>>}

Our Foo.foo(moo) call is really Foo.__dict__["foo"](moo) -- the fact that we reassigned foo in moo is never noticed. If we were to do something like Foo.foo = Foo.foo_override we would modify the class __dict__, but that doesn't give us the original semantics.

So I postulate that the main point of this warning is to suggest to you that you're creating an instance that now behaves differently to its class. Because the symmetry of calling an instance and calling a class is well understood you might end up getting some strange behaviour, especially if you start with heavy-duty introspection of classes.

Thinking about various hacks and ways to re-write this construct is kind of interesting. I think I might have found a hook for a decent interview question :)

Exploring $ORIGIN

Anyone who works with building something with a few libraries will quickly become familiar with rpath's; that is the ability to store a path inside a binary for finding dependencies at runtime. Slightly less well known is that the dynamic linker provides some options for this path specification; one in particular is a path with the special variable $ORIGIN. ld.so man page has the following to say about the an $ORIGIN appearing in the rpath:

ld.so understands the string $ORIGIN (or equivalently ${ORIGIN}) in an rpath specification to mean the directory containing the application executable. Thus, an application located in somedir/app could be compiled with gcc -Wl,-rpath,'$ORI‐ GIN/../lib' so that it finds an associated shared library in somedir/lib no matter where somedir is located in the directory hierarchy.

As a way of a small example, consider the following:

$ cat Makefile
main: main.c lib/libfoo.so
    gcc -g -Wall -o main -Wl,-rpath='$$ORIGIN/lib' -L ./lib -lfoo main.c

lib/libfoo.so: lib/foo.c
    gcc -g -Wall -fPIC -shared -o lib/libfoo.so lib/foo.c

$ cat main.c
void function(void);

int main(void)
{
   function();
   return 0;
}

$ cat lib/foo.c
#include <stdio.h>

void function(void)
{
   printf("called!\n");
}

$ make
gcc -g -Wall -fPIC -shared -o lib/libfoo.so lib/foo.c
gcc -g -Wall -o main -Wl,-rpath='$ORIGIN/lib' -L ./lib -lfoo main.c

$ ./main
called!

Now, wherever you should choose to locate main, as long as the library is in the right relative location it will be found correctly. If you are wondering how this works, examining the back-trace from the linker function that expands it is helpful:

$ gdb ./main
(gdb) break _dl_get_origin
Function "_dl_get_origin" not defined.
Make breakpoint pending on future shared library load? (y or [n]) y

Breakpoint 1 (_dl_get_origin) pending.
(gdb) r
Starting program: /tmp/test-origin/main

Breakpoint 1, _dl_get_origin () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/dl-origin.c:37
37  ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/dl-origin.c: No such file or directory.
    in ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/dl-origin.c
(gdb) bt
#0  _dl_get_origin () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/dl-origin.c:37
#1  0x00007ffff7de61f4 in expand_dynamic_string_token (l=0x7ffff7ffe128,
    s=<value optimized out>) at dl-load.c:331
#2  0x00007ffff7de62ea in decompose_rpath (sps=0x7ffff7ffe440,
    rpath=0xffffffc0 <Address 0xffffffc0 out of bounds>, l=0x0,
    what=0x7ffff7df780a "RPATH") at dl-load.c:554
#3  0x00007ffff7de7051 in _dl_init_paths (llp=0x0) at dl-load.c:722
#4  0x00007ffff7de2124 in dl_main (phdr=0x7ffff7ffe6b8,
    phnum=<value optimized out>, user_entry=0x7ffff7ffeb28) at rtld.c:1391
#5  0x00007ffff7df3647 in _dl_sysdep_start (
    start_argptr=<value optimized out>, dl_main=0x7ffff7de14e0 <dl_main>)
    at ../elf/dl-sysdep.c:243
#6  0x00007ffff7de0423 in _dl_start_final (arg=0x7fffffffe7c0) at rtld.c:338
#7  _dl_start (arg=0x7fffffffe7c0) at rtld.c:564
#8  0x00007ffff7ddfaf8 in _start () from /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2

Just from a first look we can divine that this has found the RPATH header in the dynamic section and has decided to expand the string $ORIGIN.

$ readelf --dynamic ./main

Dynamic section at offset 0x7d8 contains 23 entries:
  Tag        Type                         Name/Value
 0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED)             Shared library: [libfoo.so]
 0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED)             Shared library: [libc.so.6]
 0x000000000000000f (RPATH)              Library rpath: [$ORIGIN/lib]
 0x000000000000000c (INIT)               0x4004d8
 0x000000000000000d (FINI)               0x4006f8

At this point it proceeds to do a readlink on /proc/self/exe to get the path to the currently running binary, effectively does a basename on it and replaces the value of $ORIGIN. Interestingly, if this should fail, it will fall back on the environment variable LD_ORIGIN_PATH for unknown reasons. This might be useful if you were in a bad situation where /proc was not mounted and you still had to run your binary, although you could probably achieve the same thing via the use of LD_LIBRARY_PATH just as well.

This feature should be used with some caution to avoid turning your application in a mess that can't be packaged in any standard manner. One common example of use is probably your java virtual machine to find its implementation libraries.

$ readelf --dynamic /usr/lib/jvm/java-6-sun/bin/java

Dynamic section at offset 0x9a28 contains 25 entries:
  Tag        Type                         Name/Value
 0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED)             Shared library: [libpthread.so.0]
 0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED)             Shared library: [libjli.so]
 0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED)             Shared library: [libdl.so.2]
 0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED)             Shared library: [libc.so.6]
 0x000000000000000e (SONAME)             Library soname: [lib.so]
 0x000000000000000f (RPATH)              Library rpath: [$ORIGIN/../lib/amd64/jli:$ORIGIN/../jre/lib/amd64/jli]
 ...

There is a small but interesting security issue. If an attacker can hardlink to your binary that is using $ORIGIN then any path expansion is now relative to the attackers directory. Hence it is possible to make the linker read in arbitrary libraries and hence run arbitrary code. Clearly if your program is running setuid as someone else, such as root, you've just given up the keys to the house!

Luckily, the dynamic linker will not let you shoot yourself in the foot like this, and prevents expansion of the $ORIGIN field if the program is running setuid.

$ sudo chown root ./main
$ sudo chmod +s ./main
$ ./main
./main: error while loading shared libraries: libfoo.so: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory

However, this is a good example of why you might want to keep users home and temp directories on separate file systems away from where binaries live.

There is also a similar variable $PLATFORM, which describes the current running system. This is gained via the auxiliary vector, which I have written about here and here. Setting LD_SHOW_AUXV=1 will allow you to examine this value.

$ LD_SHOW_AUXV=1 ls
...
AT_PLATFORM:     x86_64
...

The quickest way to do nothing

As I was debugging something recently, an instruction popped up that seemed a little incongruous:

lea 0x0(%edi,%eiz,1),%edi

Now this is an interesting instruction on a few levels. Firstly, %eiz is a psuedo-register that simply equates to zero somewhat like MIPS r0; I don't think it is really in common usage. But when you look closer, this instruction is a fancy way of doing nothing. It's a little clearer in Intel syntax mode:

lea    edi,[edi+eiz*1+0x0]

So we can see that this is using scaled indexed addressing mode to load into %edi the value in %edi plus 0 * 1 with an offset of 0x0; i.e. put the value of %edi into %edi, i.e. do nothing. So why would this appear?

What we can see from the disassembley is that this single instruction takes up an impressive 7 bytes:

8048489:    8d bc 27 00 00 00 00    lea    edi,[edi+eiz*1+0x0]

Now, compare that to a standard nop which requires just a single byte to encode. Thus to pad out 7 bytes of space would require 7 nop instructions to be issued, which is a significantly slower way of doing nothing! Let's investigate just how much...

Below is a simple program that does nothing in a tight-loop; firstly using nops and then the lea do-nothing method.

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <time.h>

typedef uint64_t cycle_t;

static inline cycle_t
i386_get_cycles(void)
{
        cycle_t result;
        __asm__ __volatile__("rdtsc" : "=A" (result));
        return result;
}

#define get_cycles i386_get_cycles

int main() {

    int i;
    uint64_t t1, t2;

    t1 = get_cycles();

    /* nop do nothing */
    while (i < 100000) {
        __asm__ __volatile__("nop;nop;nop");
        i++;
    }
    t2 = get_cycles();
    printf("%ld\n", t2 - t1);

    i = 0;
    t1 = get_cycles();

    /* lea do-nothing */
    while (i < 100000) {
        __asm__ __volatile__("lea 0x0(%edi,%eiz,1),%edi");
        i++;
    }

    t2 = get_cycles();
    printf("%ld\n", t2 - t1);
}

Firstly, you'll notice that rather than the 7-bytes mentioned before, we're comparing 3-byte sequences. That's because the lea instruction ends up encoded as:

8048388:       8d 3c 27                lea    (%edi,%eiz,1),%edi

When you hand-code this instruction, you can't actually convince the assembler to pad out those extra zeros for the zero displacement because it realises it doesn't need them, so why would it waste the space! So, how did they get in there in the original disassembley? If gas is trying to align something by padding, it has built-in sequences for the most efficient way of doing that for different sizes (you can see it in i386_align_code of gas/config/tc-i386.c which adds the extra 4 bytes in directly).

Anyway, we can build and test this out (note you need the special -mindex-reg flag passed to gas to use the %eiz syntax):

$ gcc -O3 -Wa,-mindex-reg  -o wait wait.c
$ ./wait
300072
189945

So, if you need 3-bytes of padding in your code for some reason, it's ~160% slower to pad out 3-bytes with no-ops rather than a single larger instruction (at least on my aging Pentium M laptop).

So now you can rest easy knowing that even though your code is doing nothing, it is doing it in the most efficient manner possible!

Debugging __thead variables from coredumps

I think the old-fashioned coredump is a little under-appreciated these days. I'm not sure when it changed, but I even had to add myself to /etc/security/limits.conf to raise my ulimit to even create one.

Anyway, debugging __thread variables from coredumps is a bit of a pain. For the uninitiated, the __thread identifier specifies a thread-local variable, i.e. every thread gets its own copy of the variable automatically.

The implementation of this is highly architecture specific. The reason is that TLS entries need to be accessed via a register kept as part of the thread state, and thus every architecture chooses their own register and builds their own ABI. On x86-32, which is very register-limited, you certainly don't want to dedicate a register to a pointer to TLS variables and take it out of operation. Luckily there is the hang-over from the 70's (60's? 50's?) — segmentation. Without going into real detail, segment registers can be used to offset into a region of memory based on a look-up of a region descriptor stored in a table.

Simple example of gs and the GDT

Above, you see a simplified example of the %gs register loaded with the index value 2, and thus when you access %gs:20 what you are saying is "find entry 2 in the global descriptor table (GDT), follow it and offset 20 into that region.

The kernel gives each thread its own GDT (i.e. the GDT register is part of the thread-state). Thus __thread variables are stored based on segment offsets and — voila — thread-local storage. Now, there's a few tricks here. For various reasons, a process can not setup entries in the GDT; this is a privileged operation that must be done by the kernel. There is actually a special system call for threads to setup their TLS areas in the GDT — set_thread_area. When a new thread starts, the thread-library and dynamic linker conspire to allocate and load any static TLS data (i.e. if you have a global __thread variable initialised to some value, then every thread must see that value when it starts) and then calls this to make sure the variables are ready to go. After that, the gs register is filled with the index of that GDT entry, and all TLS access goes via it. That, in a nut-shell, is TLS for x86-32.

Now, to the problem. Take, for example, the following short program:

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <pthread.h>

int __thread foo;

void* thread(void *in) {

        foo = (int)in;

        printf("foo is %d\n", foo);

        while (1) {
                sleep(10);
        }
}

int main(void) {

        pthread_t threads[5];
        int i;

        for (i=0; i<5; i++) {
                pthread_create(&threads[i], NULL,
                               thread, (void*)i);
        }

        sleep(5);
        abort();
}

We start a few threads and then abort to make it dump core. But, if you try and examine foo:

$ gdb ./thread core
GNU gdb (GDB) 7.2-debian
Reading symbols from /home/ianw/tmp/thread/thread...done.
[New Thread 4970]
[New Thread 4975]
[New Thread 4974]
[New Thread 4973]
[New Thread 4972]
[New Thread 4971]

Core was generated by `./thread'.
Program terminated with signal 6, Aborted.
#0  0xffffe424 in __kernel_vsyscall ()
(gdb) print foo
Cannot find thread-local variables on this target

It seems that gdb doesn't know how to find the value of foo because its not a variable in the usual sense ("this target", in this case, means a coredump). It relies on accessing via the gs register, which relies on the current processes' GDT state, which has since been destroyed. If you care to consult the canonical source of TLS info, you can find out exactly why this is so hard to figure out generically. However, with some work, we can start to figure out the value by hand.

A coredump is really a ELF file full of just two things: a bunch of LOAD segments that are just dumps of the process memory regions, and a NOTE section that includes a bunch of notes that the kernel dumps out for us such as the current register state, the process id, the signal that killed us, etc. Here's an example of a core file under readelf

$ readelf --headers ./core
ELF Header:
  Magic:   7f 45 4c 46 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  Class:                             ELF32
...
  OS/ABI:                            UNIX - System V
...
  Type:                              CORE (Core file)
...
There are no sections in this file.

Program Headers:
  Type           Offset   VirtAddr   PhysAddr   FileSiz MemSiz  Flg Align
  NOTE           0x0003d4 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x006b4 0x00000     0
  LOAD           0x001000 0x08048000 0x00000000 0x00000 0x01000 R E 0x1000
  LOAD           0x001000 0x08049000 0x00000000 0x01000 0x01000 RW  0x1000
  LOAD           0x002000 0x0804a000 0x00000000 0x21000 0x21000 RW  0x1000
  LOAD           0x023000 0x46015000 0x00000000 0x00000 0x1b000 R E 0x1000
  LOAD           0x023000 0x46030000 0x00000000 0x01000 0x01000 R   0x1000
  LOAD           0x024000 0x46031000 0x00000000 0x01000 0x01000 RW  0x1000
...

You can examine the notes; with readelf we see:

$ readelf --notes ./core

Notes at offset 0x000003d4 with length 0x000006b4:
  Owner                 Data size      Description
  CORE                 0x00000090      NT_PRSTATUS (prstatus structure)
  CORE                 0x0000007c      NT_PRPSINFO (prpsinfo structure)
  CORE                 0x000000a0      NT_AUXV (auxiliary vector)
  LINUX                0x00000030      Unknown note type: (0x00000200)
  CORE                 0x00000090      NT_PRSTATUS (prstatus structure)
  LINUX                0x00000030      Unknown note type: (0x00000200)
  CORE                 0x00000090      NT_PRSTATUS (prstatus structure)
  LINUX                0x00000030      Unknown note type: (0x00000200)
  CORE                 0x00000090      NT_PRSTATUS (prstatus structure)
  LINUX                0x00000030      Unknown note type: (0x00000200)
  CORE                 0x00000090      NT_PRSTATUS (prstatus structure)
  LINUX                0x00000030      Unknown note type: (0x00000200)
  CORE                 0x00000090      NT_PRSTATUS (prstatus structure)
  LINUX                0x00000030      Unknown note type: (0x00000200)

This shows 5 notes of type NT_PRSTATUS; it should be little surprise that each of these notes describes the process status of one running thread. When gdb pops up [New Thread 4973] that's because it just hit another note that describes the new thread.

To actually make sense of the note, however, we need some other tools that look deeper. The elfutils based tools give us a better description of the various notes in the coredump; more akin to what GDB is interpreting them as. Below I've extracted one thread's info:

$ eu-readelf --notes core
...
  CORE                 144  PRSTATUS
    info.si_signo: 6, info.si_code: 0, info.si_errno: 0, cursig: 6
    sigpend: <>
    sighold: <>
    pid: 4970, ppid: 4960, pgrp: 4970, sid: 4960
    utime: 0.000000, stime: 0.000000, cutime: 0.000000, cstime: 0.000000
    orig_eax: 270, fpvalid: 0
    ebx:           4970  ecx:           4970  edx:              6
    esi:              0  edi:     1176018932  ebp:     0xbfa5b710
    eax:              0  eip:     0xffffe424  eflags:  0x00000206
    esp:     0xbfa5b6f8
    ds: 0x007b  es: 0x007b  fs: 0x0000  gs: 0x0033  cs: 0x0073  ss: 0x007b
  LINUX                 48  386_TLS
    index: 6, base: 0xb6043b70, limit: 0x000fffff, flags: 0x00000051
    index: 7, base: 0x00000000, limit: 0x00000000, flags: 0x00000028
    index: 8, base: 0x00000000, limit: 0x00000000, flags: 0x00000028

What's particularly interesting here is that the note type that was previously unknown (Unknown note type: (0x00000200)) has been resolved for us — it is in fact of type NT_386_TLS and is a dump of the GDT entries for the thread.

So, if we examine how our function is accessing our TLS variable by disassembling the thread function:

(gdb) disassemble thread
Dump of assembler code for function thread:
   0x08048514 <+0>:    push   %ebp
   0x08048515 <+1>:    mov    %esp,%ebp
   0x08048517 <+3>:    sub    $0x18,%esp
   0x0804851a <+6>:    mov    0x8(%ebp),%eax
   0x0804851d <+9>:    mov    %eax,%gs:0xfffffffc
   0x08048523 <+15>:   mov    %gs:0xfffffffc,%edx
   0x0804852a <+22>:   mov    $0x8048670,%eax
   0x0804852f <+27>:   mov    %edx,0x4(%esp)
   0x08048533 <+31>:   mov    %eax,(%esp)
   0x08048536 <+34>:   call   0x80483f4 <printf@plt>
   0x0804853b <+39>:   movl   $0xa,(%esp)
   0x08048542 <+46>:   call   0x8048404 <sleep@plt>
   0x08048547 <+51>:   jmp    0x804853b <thread+39>

Examining the disassembly we can see that foo is accessed via an offset of -4 from %gs (this is OK, as our limit value is maxed out. See the TLS ABI doc for more info). Now, we can examine gs and see which selector it is telling us to use:

(gdb) print $gs >> 3
$31 = 6

Above we shift out the last 3 bits, as these refer to the privilege level (bits 0 and 1) and if this is a GDT or LDT reference (bit 2). Thus, looking at the GDT descriptor for index 6:

LINUX                 48  386_TLS
  index: 6, base: 0xb6043b70, limit: 0x000fffff, flags: 0x00000051

we can finally do some maths from the base-address to figure out the value:

(gdb) print *(int*)(0xb6043b70 - 4)
$34 = 3

Thus we have found our TLS value; in this case for thread 3 the value is indeed 3. I caution this is the simplest possible case; other "models" (see the TLS doc, again) may not be so simple to work out by hand, but this would certainly be how you would start.

PLT and GOT - the key to code sharing and dynamic libraries

(this post was going to be about something else, but after getting this far, I think it stands on its own as an introduction to dynamic linking)

The shared library is an integral part of a modern system, but often the mechanisms behind the implementation are less well understood. There are, of course, many guides to this sort of thing. Hopefully this adds another perspective that resonates with someone.

Let's start at the beginning — - relocations are entries in binaries that are left to be filled in later -- at link time by the toolchain linker or at runtime by the dynamic linker. A relocation in a binary is a descriptor which essentially says "determine the value of X, and put that value into the binary at offset Y" — each relocation has a specific type, defined in the ABI documentation, which describes exactly how "determine the value of" is actually determined.

Here's the simplest example:

$ cat a.c
extern int foo;

int function(void) {
    return foo;
}
$ gcc -c a.c
$ readelf --relocs ./a.o

Relocation section '.rel.text' at offset 0x2dc contains 1 entries:
 Offset     Info    Type            Sym.Value  Sym. Name
00000004  00000801 R_386_32          00000000   foo

The value of foo is not known at the time you make a.o, so the compiler leaves behind a relocation (of type R_386_32) which is saying "in the final binary, patch the value at offset 0x4 in this object file with the address of symbol foo". If you take a look at the output, you can see at offset 0x4 there are 4-bytes of zeros just waiting for a real address:

$ objdump --disassemble ./a.o

./a.o:     file format elf32-i386


Disassembly of section .text:

00000000 <function>:
   0:    55         push   %ebp
   1:    89 e5                  mov    %esp,%ebp
   3:    a1 00 00 00 00         mov    0x0,%eax
   8:    5d                     pop    %ebp
   9:    c3                     ret

That's link time; if you build another object file with a value of foo and build that into a final executable, the relocation can go away. But there is a whole bunch of stuff for a fully linked executable or shared-library that just can't be resolved until runtime. The major reason, as I shall try to explain, is position-independent code (PIC). When you look at an executable file, you'll notice it has a fixed load address

$ readelf --headers /bin/ls
[...]
ELF Header:
[...]
  Entry point address:               0x8049bb0

Program Headers:
  Type           Offset   VirtAddr   PhysAddr   FileSiz MemSiz  Flg Align
[...]
  LOAD           0x000000 0x08048000 0x08048000 0x16f88 0x16f88 R E 0x1000
  LOAD           0x016f88 0x0805ff88 0x0805ff88 0x01543 0x01543 RW  0x1000

This is not position-independent. The code section (with permissions R E; i.e. read and execute) must be loaded at virtual address 0x08048000, and the data section (RW) must be loaded above that at exactly 0x0805ff88.

This is fine for an executable, because each time you start a new process (fork and exec) you have your own fresh address space. Thus it is a considerable time saving to pre-calculate addresses from and have them fixed in the final output (you can make position-independent executables, but that's another story).

This is not fine for a shared library (.so). The whole point of a shared library is that applications pick-and-choose random permutations of libraries to achieve what they want. If your shared library is built to only work when loaded at one particular address everything may be fine — until another library comes along that was built also using that address. The problem is actually somewhat tractable — you can just enumerate every single shared library on the system and assign them all unique address ranges, ensuring that whatever combinations of library are loaded they never overlap. This is essentially what prelinking does (although that is a hint, rather than a fixed, required address base). Apart from being a maintenance nightmare, with 32-bit systems you rapidly start to run out of address-space if you try to give every possible library a unique location. Thus when you examine a shared library, they do not specify a particular base address to be loaded at:

$ readelf --headers /lib/libc.so.6
Program Headers:
  Type           Offset   VirtAddr   PhysAddr   FileSiz MemSiz  Flg Align
[...]
  LOAD           0x000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x236ac 0x236ac R E 0x1000
  LOAD           0x023edc 0x00024edc 0x00024edc 0x0015c 0x001a4 RW  0x1000

Shared libraries also have a second goal — code sharing. If a hundred processes use a shared library, it makes no sense to have 100 copies of the code in memory taking up space. If the code is completely read-only, and hence never, ever, modified, then every process can share the same code. However, we have the constraint that the shared library must still have a unqiue data instance in each process. While it would be possible to put the library data anywhere we want at runtime, this would require leaving behind relocations to patch the code and inform it where to actually find the data — destroying the always read-only property of the code and thus sharability. As you can see from the above headers, the solution is that the read-write data section is always put at a known offset from the code section of the library. This way, via the magic of virtual-memory, every process sees its own data section but can share the unmodified code. All that is needed to access data is some simple maths; address of thing I want = my current address + known fixed offset.

Well, simple maths is all relative! "My current address" may or may not be easy to find. Consider the following:

$ cat test.c
static int foo = 100;

int function(void) {
    return foo;
}
$ gcc -fPIC -shared -o libtest.so test.c

So foo will be in data, at a fixed offset from the code in function, and all we need to do is find it! On amd64, this is quite easy, check the disassembly:

000000000000056c <function>:
 56c:        55         push   %rbp
 56d:        48 89 e5               mov    %rsp,%rbp
 570:        8b 05 b2 02 20 00      mov    0x2002b2(%rip),%eax        # 200828 <foo>
 576:        5d                     pop    %rbp

This says "put the value at offset 0x2002b2 from the current instruction pointer (%rip) into %eax. That's it — we know the data is at that fixed offset so we're done. i386, on the other hand, doesn't have the ability to offset from the current instruction pointer. Some trickery is required there:

0000040c <function>:
 40c:    55         push   %ebp
 40d:    89 e5                  mov    %esp,%ebp
 40f:    e8 0e 00 00 00         call   422 <__i686.get_pc_thunk.cx>
 414:    81 c1 5c 11 00 00      add    $0x115c,%ecx
 41a:    8b 81 18 00 00 00      mov    0x18(%ecx),%eax
 420:    5d                     pop    %ebp
 421:    c3                     ret

00000422 <__i686.get_pc_thunk.cx>:
 422:    8b 0c 24       mov    (%esp),%ecx
 425:    c3                     ret

The magic here is __i686.get_pc_thunk.cx. The architecture does not let us get the current instruction address, but we can get a known fixed address — the value __i686.get_pc_thunk.cx pushes into cx is the return value from the call, i.e in this case 0x414. Then we can do the maths for the add instruction; 0x115c + 0x414 = 0x1570, the final move goes 0x18 bytes past that to 0x1588 ... checking the disassembly

00001588 <global>:
    1588:       64 00 00                add    %al,%fs:(%eax)

i.e., the value 100 in decimal, stored in the data section.

We are getting closer, but there are still some issues to deal with. If a shared library can be loaded at any address, then how does an executable, or other shared library, know how to access data or call functions in it? We could, theoretically, load the library and patch up any data references or calls into that library; however as just described this would destroy code-sharability. As we know, all problems can be solved with a layer of indirection, in this case called global offset table or GOT.

Consider the following library:

$ cat test.c
extern int foo;

int function(void) {
    return foo;
}
$ gcc -shared -fPIC -o libtest.so test.c

Note this looks exactly like before, but in this case the foo is extern; presumably provided by some other library. Let's take a closer look at how this works, on amd64:

$ objdump --disassemble libtest.so
[...]
00000000000005ac <function>:
 5ac:        55         push   %rbp
 5ad:        48 89 e5               mov    %rsp,%rbp
 5b0:        48 8b 05 71 02 20 00   mov    0x200271(%rip),%rax        # 200828 <_DYNAMIC+0x1a0>
 5b7:        8b 00                  mov    (%rax),%eax
 5b9:        5d                     pop    %rbp
 5ba:        c3                     retq

$ readelf --sections libtest.so
Section Headers:
  [Nr] Name              Type             Address           Offset
       Size              EntSize          Flags  Link  Info  Align
[...]
  [20] .got              PROGBITS         0000000000200818  00000818
       0000000000000020  0000000000000008  WA       0     0     8

$ readelf --relocs libtest.so
Relocation section '.rela.dyn' at offset 0x418 contains 5 entries:
  Offset          Info           Type           Sym. Value    Sym. Name + Addend
[...]
000000200828  000400000006 R_X86_64_GLOB_DAT 0000000000000000 foo + 0

The disassembly shows that the value to be returned is loaded from an offset of 0x200271 from the current %rip; i.e. 0x0200828. Looking at the section headers, we see that this is part of the .got section. When we examine the relocations, we see a R_X86_64_GLOB_DAT relocation that says "find the value of symbol foo and put it into address 0x200828.

So, when this library is loaded, the dynamic loader will examine the relocation, go and find the value of foo and patch the .got entry as required. When it comes time for the code loads to load that value, it will point to the right place and everything just works; without having to modify any code values and thus destroy code sharability.

This handles data, but what about function calls? The indirection used here is called a procedure linkage table or PLT. Code does not call an external function directly, but only via a PLT stub. Let's examine this:

$ cat test.c
int foo(void);

int function(void) {
    return foo();
}
$ gcc -shared -fPIC -o libtest.so test.c

$ objdump --disassemble libtest.so
[...]
00000000000005bc <function>:
 5bc:        55         push   %rbp
 5bd:        48 89 e5               mov    %rsp,%rbp
 5c0:        e8 0b ff ff ff         callq  4d0 <foo@plt>
 5c5:        5d                     pop    %rbp

$ objdump --disassemble-all libtest.so
00000000000004d0 <foo@plt>:
 4d0:   ff 25 82 03 20 00       jmpq   *0x200382(%rip)        # 200858 <_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+0x18>
 4d6:   68 00 00 00 00          pushq  $0x0
 4db:   e9 e0 ff ff ff          jmpq   4c0 <_init+0x18>

$ readelf --relocs libtest.so
Relocation section '.rela.plt' at offset 0x478 contains 2 entries:
  Offset          Info           Type           Sym. Value    Sym. Name + Addend
000000200858  000400000007 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 0000000000000000 foo + 0

So, we see that function makes a call to code at 0x4d0. Disassembling this, we see an interesting call, we jump to the value stored in 0x200382 past the current %rip (i.e. 0x200858), which we can then see the relocation for — the symbol foo.

It is interesting to keep following this through; let's look at the initial value that is jumped to:

$ objdump --disassemble-all libtest.so

Disassembly of section .got.plt:

0000000000200840 <.got.plt>:
  200840:       98                      cwtl
  200841:       06                      (bad)
  200842:       20 00                   and    %al,(%rax)
        ...
  200858:       d6                      (bad)
  200859:       04 00                   add    $0x0,%al
  20085b:       00 00                   add    %al,(%rax)
  20085d:       00 00                   add    %al,(%rax)
  20085f:       00 e6                   add    %ah,%dh
  200861:       04 00                   add    $0x0,%al
  200863:       00 00                   add    %al,(%rax)
  200865:       00 00                   add    %al,(%rax)
        ...

Unscrambling 0x200858 we see its initial value is 0x4d6 — i.e. the next instruction! Which then pushes the value 0 and jumps to 0x4c0. Looking at that code we can see it pushes a value from the GOT, and then jumps to a second value in the GOT:

00000000000004c0 <foo@plt-0x10>:
 4c0:   ff 35 82 03 20 00       pushq  0x200382(%rip)        # 200848 <_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+0x8>
 4c6:   ff 25 84 03 20 00       jmpq   *0x200384(%rip)        # 200850 <_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+0x10>
 4cc:   0f 1f 40 00             nopl   0x0(%rax)

What's going on here? What's actually happening is lazy binding — by convention when the dynamic linker loads a library, it will put an identifier and resolution function into known places in the GOT. Therefore, what happens is roughly this: on the first call of a function, it falls through to call the default stub, which loads the identifier and calls into the dynamic linker, which at that point has enough information to figure out "hey, this libtest.so is trying to find the function foo". It will go ahead and find it, and then patch the address into the GOT such that the next time the original PLT entry is called, it will load the actual address of the function, rather than the lookup stub. Ingenious!

Out of this indirection falls another handy thing — the ability to modify the symbol binding order. LD_PRELOAD, for example, simply tells the dynamic loader it should insert a library as first to be looked-up for symbols; therefore when the above binding happens if the preloaded library declares a foo, it will be chosen over any other one provided.

In summary — code should be read-only always, and to make it so that you can still access data from other libraries and call external functions these accesses are indirected through a GOT and PLT which live at compile-time known offsets.

In a future post I'll discuss some of the security issues around this implementation, but that post won't make sense unless I can refer back to this one :)

Toolchains, libc and interesting interactions

When building a user space binary, the -lc that gcc inserts into the final link seems pretty straight forward — link the C library. As with all things system-library related there is more to investigate.

If you look at /usr/lib/libc.so; the "library" that gets linked when you specify -lc, it is not a library as such, but a link script which specifies the libraries to link, which also includes the dynamic linker itself:

$ cat /usr/lib/libc.so
/* GNU ld script
   Use the shared library, but some functions are only in
   the static library, so try that secondarily.  */
OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf64-x86-64)
GROUP ( /lib/libc.so.6 /usr/lib/libc_nonshared.a  AS_NEEDED ( /lib/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 ) )

On very old glibc's the AS_NEEDED didn't appear; so every binary really did have a DT_NEEDED entry for the dynamic linker itself. This can be somewhat confusing if you're ever doing forensics on an old binary which seems to have these entries for not apparent reason. However, we can see that that /lib/libc.so itself does actually require symbols from the dynamic linker:

$ readelf --dynamic /lib/libc.so.6 | grep NEEDED
 0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED)             Shared library: [ld-linux-x86-64.so.2]

Although you're unlikely to encounter it, a broken toolchain can cause havoc if it gets the link order wrong here, because the glibc dynamic linker defines minimal versions of malloc and friends -- you've got a chicken-and-egg problem using libc's malloc before you've loaded it! You can simulate this havoc with something like:

$ cat foo.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <syslog.h>

int main(void)
{
   syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "hello, world!");
   return 0;
}

$ cat libbroken.so
GROUP ( /lib/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 )

$ gcc -o -Wall -Wl,-rpath=. -L. -lbroken -g -o foo foo.c

$ ./foo
Inconsistency detected by ld.so: dl-minimal.c: 138: realloc: Assertion `ptr == alloc_last_block' failed!

Depending on various versions of things, you might see that assert or possibly just strange, corrupt output in your logs as syslog calls the wrong malloc. You could debug something like this by asking the dynamic linker to show you its bindings as it resolves them:

$ LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT=foo.txt LD_DEBUG=bindings ./foo
Inconsistency detected by ld.so: dl-minimal.c: 138: realloc: Assertion `ptr == alloc_last_block' failed!

$ cat foo.txt.11360 | grep "\`malloc'"
     11360: binding file /lib/libc.so.6 [0] to /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 [0]: normal symbol `malloc' [GLIBC_2.2.5]
     11360: binding file /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 [0] to /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 [0]: normal symbol `malloc' [GLIBC_2.2.5]
     11360: binding file /lib/libc.so.6 [0] to /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 [0]: normal symbol `malloc' [GLIBC_2.2.5]

Above, because the dynamic loader comes first in the link order, libc.so.6's malloc has bound to the minimal implementation it provides, rather the full-featured one it provides internally.

As an aside, AFAICT, there is really only one reason why a normal library will link against the dynamic loader -- for the thread-local storage support function __tls_get_addr. You can try this yourself:

$ cat tls.c
char __thread *foo;

char* moo(void) {
    return foo;
}
$ gcc -fPIC -o libtls.so -shared tls.c
$ readelf -d ./libtls.so  | grep NEED
 0x00000001 (NEEDED)                     Shared library: [libc.so.6]
 0x00000001 (NEEDED)                     Shared library: [ld-linux.so.2]
 0x6ffffffe (VERNEED)                    0x314
 0x6fffffff (VERNEEDNUM)                 2

Thread-local storage is worthy of a book of its own, but the gist is that this support function says "hey, give me an address of foo in libtls.so", the magic being that if the current thread has never accessed foo then it may not actually have any storage for foo yet, so the dynamic linker can allocate some memory for it lazily and then return the right thing. Otherwise, every thread that started would need to reserve room for foo "just in case", even if it never cares about moo.

But looking a little closer at the symbols of libc.so is also interesting. libc.so doesn't actually have many functions you can override. You can see what it is possible to override by checking the relocations against the procdure-lookup table (PLT).

Relocation section '.rela.plt' at offset 0x1e770 contains 8 entries:
  Offset          Info           Type           Sym. Value    Sym. Name + Addend
00000035b000  084600000007 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 00000000000a2100 sysconf + 0
00000035b008  02e000000007 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 0000000000075e50 calloc + 0
00000035b010  01dd00000007 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 0000000000077910 realloc + 0
00000035b018  029300000007 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 00000000000661c0 feof + 0
00000035b020  046f00000007 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 00000000000768c0 malloc + 0
00000035b028  000400000007 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 0000000000000000 __tls_get_addr + 0
00000035b030  01b400000007 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 0000000000076dd0 memalign + 0
00000035b038  086000000007 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 00000000000767e0 free + 0

i.e. instead of jumping directly to the malloc defined in the libc code section, any internal calls will jump to this stub which, the first time, asks the dynamic linker to go out and find the address of malloc (it then saves it, so the second time the stub just jumps to the saved location).

This is an interesting list, seemingly without much order. feof, for example, stands out as worth checking out a bit closer — why would that be there when fopen isn't, say? We can track down where it comes from with a bit of detective work; knowing that the value of the symbol feof will be placed into 0x35b018 we can disassemble libc.so to see that this address is used by the feof PLT stub at 0x1e870 (luckily, objdump has done the math to offest from the rip for us; i.e. 0x1e876 + 0x33c7a2 = 0x35b018)

000000000001e870 <feof@plt>:
   1e870:       ff 25 a2 c7 33 00       jmpq   *0x33c7a2(%rip)        # 35b018 <_IO_file_jumps+0xb18>
   1e876:       68 03 00 00 00          pushq  $0x3
   1e87b:       e9 b0 ff ff ff          jmpq   1e830 <h_errno+0x1e7dc>

From there we can search for anyone jumping to that address, and find out the caller:

$ objdump --disassemble-all /lib/libc.so.6 | grep 1e870
000000000001e870 <feof@plt>:
   1e870:   ff 25 a2 c7 33 00       jmpq   *0x33c7a2(%rip)        # 35b018 <_IO_file_jumps+0xb18>
   f19f7:   e8 74 ce f2 ff          callq  1e870 <feof@plt>

$ addr2line -e /lib/libc.so.6 f19f7
/home/aurel32/eglibc/eglibc-2.11.2/sunrpc/bindrsvprt.c:70

Which turns out to be part of a local patch which probably gets things a little wrong, as described below. The sysconf relocation is from a similar add-on patch (being used to find the page size, it seems).

libc, like all sensible libraries, uses the hidden attribute on symbols to restrict what is exported by the library. The benefit of this is that when the linker knows you are referencing a hidden symbol it knows that the value can never be overridden, and thus does not need to emit extra code to do indirection just in case you ever wish to redirect the symbols. In the above, it appears that feof has never been marked as hidden, probably because no internal glibc functions used it until that add-on patch, and since it is not considered an internal function the linker must allow for the possibility that it will be overridden at run time and provide a PLT slot for it. There are consequences; if this was on a fast-path then the extra jumps required to go via the PLT may matter for performance and it may also cause strange behaviour if somebody had preloaded something that took over feof.

Note, this is different from saying that your library can override symbols provided by libc.so; such as when you LD_PRELOAD a library to wrap an open call. What you can not override is the open call that say, the internal libc.so function getusershell does to read /etc/shells.

Having the malloc related calls as preemptable seems intentional and sane; although I can not find a comment to the effect of "we deliberately leave these like this so that users may use alternative malloc implementations", it makes sense so that libc.so is internally using the same malloc as everything else if you choose to use something such as tc-malloc.

tl;dr? Digging into your system libraries is always interesting. Be careful with your link order when creating toolchains, and be careful about symbol visibility when you're working with libraries.